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THE FRAMERS' MUSE ON REPUBLICANISM,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND
PRAGMATIC CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETIVISM
David M O'Brien*
The Supreme Court is currently in retreat from libertarian constructions of the rights of individuals and minorities. Ironically,
this retreat coincides with the bicentenary of the bill of Rights,
drafted and debated in 1789 and ratified in 1791. No less ironic,
political opposition to the Court's previously broad construction of
those guarantees has been inspired by what is called the "Madisonian dilemma."I Simply put, the dilemma is one of allowing majorities to govern while also safeguarding the rights of minorities.
The Court's critics argued that majoritarianism was central to the
"Madisonian system," and therefore judicial review ought to be
sharply limited in deference to legislative majorities. The Warren
and the Burger Courts' rulings striking down state laws in defense
of individual rights were thus attacked for being countermajoritarian.2 Opposition to their rulings is now internalized
within the Court itself, due to changes in its composition and the
emergence of a solid conservative bloc on the Rehnquist Court.3
The problem of the Court's institutional role is not new. But,
the "Madisonian dilemma" gave it a new twist and "set the terms
* Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs.
Copyrighted 1990, David M. O'Brien. This article was originally prepared for delivery at the
"James Madison Symposium" in Madisonville, Kentucky, September 27, 1990, and appears
in a slightly different version in The Review of Politics ( 1991 ). The author is grateful for the
support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Kentucky Humanities Council,
and his former colleague, Robert J. Morgan, as well as for the assistance of Steve Bragaw.
While absolving them of responsibility for any of the interpretative arguments here, the author benefited from the reading of and comments on an early draft by Professors Lance Banning, Kermit Hall, and Leonard Levy.
I. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING Of AMERICA 239 (1990).
2. For further discussion, see O'Brien, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to
Rehnquist, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS 12 (1987).
3. See, O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court Comes of Age, UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUCATION 3 (Fall 1989); and Chemerinsky, Forword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 44 (1989).
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for the contemporary debate over judicial review."4 "The root difficulty," argued Alexander Bickel, "is that judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force in our system ... [because] it thwarts the
will of representatives of the actual people of here and now, and
therefore is a 'deviant institution in the American democracy.' "s
Judicial review "must achieve some measure of consonance," Bickel
contended, with "the idea, central to the process of gaining the consent of the governed, that the majority has the ultimate power to
displace the decision-makers and to reject any part of their policy. "6
Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, among others, champion
this interpretation of constitutional politics as well.7 Justice Scalia,
for instance, defends a "jurisprudence of original intentions" on the
following ground:
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution confers upon the courts the power to inquire
into, rather than passively assume, the constitutionality of federal statutes. . . .
Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a much more appropriate exposi·
tor of social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in England, prevaiJ.8

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith 9 is illustrative of how Justice Scalia's understanding of the
Court's limited role undergirds his interpretation of the Constitution. The discussion is also, I argue later, sharply at odds with
James Madison's vision of constitutional politics. Smith involved
two Native-American Indians denied unemployment compensation.
They had been discharged for taking peyote for sacramental purposes during religious ceremonies of the Native American Church.
Citing Sherbert v. Verner 10 the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted
the free exercise clause to require the state to demonstrate a compelling interest. In a sweeping opinion for the Court, however, Justice
Scalia rejected Sherbert's balancing test. In spite of Sherbert and
other prior rulings, Justice Scalia held that the first amendment
guarantee for religious freedom does not require exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Moreover, he observed that, "[v]alues
that are protected against government interference through en4.
5.
6.

Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 71.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-18 (1962).
/d. at 27.
BoRK, supra note I, at 139.
Scalia, Originialism: The Lesser Evil, 51 CINN. L. REv. 849, 854 (1989) (emphasis

7.
8.
added).
9. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990).
10. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the
political process." 11 Except when the government is literally forbidden by the Constitution from legislating on specific matters, in
Justice Scalia's view, the meaning of the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights should be determined not by the Court but by the forces of
majoritarian democracy in state legislatures.12 In Justice Scalia's
words:l3
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.

Although not drawing the same conclusions as Justice Scalia,
even defenders of libertarian rulings of the Warren Courts, including Jesse Choper,l4 John Ely,1s and Michael Perry,l6 have taken the
"Madisonian dilemma" for granted in their ill-fated attempts to reconcile judicial review and majoritarian democracy. 11 Not everyone,
to be sure, has been deceived by that formation of the Court's problem. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., for one, countered that,
"Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another. Those
who drafted our Constitution understood the difference. One cannot read the text without admitting that it embodies substantive
choices; it places certain values beyond the power of any legislature."ls No less eloquently, Justice Robert Jackson observed that,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections. 19

Still, the "Madisonian dilemma" has dominated contemporary deII. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
at 1606.
12. See also, Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
13. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
at 1606.
14. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 4-6
(1980).
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-9 (1980).
16. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1982).
But, see and compare, M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 164 (1984).
17. See O'Brien, Judicial Review and Constitutional Politics: Theory and Practice, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1052 (1981).
18. Address by Justice W. Brennan, Jr., at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985) (entitled "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification.")
19. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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bate and suggested a "majoritarian paradigm"2o for the Rehnquist
Court's construction of constitutional law.
The "Madisonian dilemma" has been misleading in many
ways, not only in debates over the Court but also in writing about
the Framers' Muse, James Madison. Whether or not the "republican revival"2J in constitutional scholarship contributes to reorienting debate over the Court, Madison's theory of republicanism
merits re-examination. My aim here, however, goes beyond simply
showing that the "Madisonian dilemma" as constructed by Bickel
and Bork is unfaithful to Madison's political vision. As a genuinely
original political thinker and one of the chief architects of the Constitution, Madison developed a unique theory of republicanism and
a novel theory of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to Bickel
and Bork, republican liberty, not majoritarianism, lies at the heart
of the Madisonian system. Indeed, Madison was convinced that republican liberty was primarily threatened by popular majorities and
legislative majorities in both Congress and the states. For that reason, he redefined republicanism, endeavoring to combine the institutions of representative government with auxiliary precautions for
the rights of individuals and minorities. Far from rendering the
Court a "deviant institution," Madison laid a basis for the Court's
role in defending republican liberty. Madison anticipated and rejected a "jurisprudence of original intentions," and articulated instead a theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism.
MADISON'S REPUBLIC
"Who are the Best keepers of the People's Liberties?"22 No
less than today, that question was widely debated during the
Founding. Madison posed it in a dialogue between a Republican
and an Anti-republican, published anonymously a year after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The short answer for the Republican
was:23
I.

The people themselves. The sacred trust can be no where so safe as in the
hands most interested in preserving it.
20. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 61.
21. See id. at 74-95; M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (1988); Fallon, What Is Republicanism, And Is it Worth Reviving, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Michelman, Foreword: Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. (1986); Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); and Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
22. Madison, Who are the Best Keepers of the People's Liberties, National Gazette, Dec.
20, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 426 (1983).
23. Id.
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By contrast, the Anti-republican responded:
The people are stupid, suspicious, licentious. They cannot safely trust themselves. When they have established government they should think of nothing but
obedience, leaving the care of their liberties to their wise rulers.

At that, the Republican countered:
Although all men are born free ... yet too true it is, that slavery has been the
general lot of the human race. Ignorant-they have been cheated; asleqr-they
have been surprised: divided-the yoke has been forced upon them. but what is the
lesson?

The lesson Madison drew was that republicanism presumed a
"people [who were] enlightened ... awakened ... [and] united" in
watching over the watchmen. Republican liberty ultimately depended on a people who cared about res publica, the public thing.
Yet, according to Madison, the people themselves posed the greatest threat to republicanism. And that created a real dilemma for
Madison, because he championed republican liberty, popular selfgovernment, first and foremost. "What a perversion of the natural
order of things," as he observed through the words of the Republican, "to make power the primary and central object of the social
system, and Liberty but its satellite. "24 Madison's republicanism
took a distinctively American form, based on a faith in reason and a
libertarian dedication to safeguarding the rights of individuals and
minorities from the oppressive forces of majoritarianism.
"Republicanism" was the watchword of the Founding period.2s It stood for popular sovereignty, in Montesquieu's words,
for a government in which "the body or only a part of the people is
possessed of supreme power. "26 Still, there was wide disagreement
over what it entailed. Like "federalism," "state sovereignty" and
much else, the meaning of "republicanism" was if anything less
clear and more divisive than today.21 During the Founding, political discourse was ambiguous and in flux. Madison's contribution
to the conceptual change in the understanding of "republicanism"
was unique. His republicanism presumed that nature-that is, individuals' self-interests and the conditions of American life-could be
improved by political architecture.
24. /d.
25. See, Hanson, 'Commons' and 'Commonwealth' at the American Founding, Demoerotic Republicanism as the New American Hybrid, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 165 (T. Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds. 1988).
26. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. I, at 107 (0. Carrithers ed. 1977).
27. See, F. MCDoNALD, NOVUS 0RDO SECLORUM 4-5 (1985); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 485, 513, 562 (1972); and O'Brien, Federalism as a Metaphor in the Constitutional Politics of Public Administration, 49 Pus. ADMIN.
REV. 411 (1989).
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Before the Constitutional Convention convened in May of
1787, Madison undertook a study of confederations and the
problems besieging the Continental Congress in order to form "in
his own mind some outlines of a new system. "2s One result was a
series of notes on Ancient & Modern Confederacies, prepared in the
spring of 1786.29 Another, prepared the following spring, was a
memorandum on the Vices of the Political System of the United
States. 30 The latter contains one of his clearest statements of the
problems of securing republican liberty. Surprisingly, it neither begins nor ends with a catalogue of the structural and practical
problems of the Articles of Confederation. Instead, Madison focuses on state encroachments on federal authority and denial of the
rights of individuals and minorities. The "multiplicity," "mutability," and "injustice" of state laws were "more alarming," because
they brought "into question the fundamental principle of republican
Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments, are
the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights."3I
According to Madison, the denial of individual rights by legislative
majorities was at the root of the crisis in republicanism in the 1780s.
In Vices, and throughout his career, Madison was preoccupied
with safeguarding "the rights and interests of the minority, or of
individuals" against oppression by popular majorities, whether operating through the legislative process in Congress or the states. 32
Unrestricted rule by popular majorities struck "at the very heart of
republicanism"33 by denying the possibility of governance by a
"constitutional majority. "34
Republican liberty, including the rights and interests of individuals and minorities, was endangered by the influence that popular majorities had, "1. in the Representative bodies, 2. in the people
themselves."3s In Vices and elsewhere, he complained that representatives in Congress and state legislatures failed to pay "fidelity to
28. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted in 9
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382-83 (1975).
29. Madison, Ancient & Modem Confederacies, reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 3 (1975).
30. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (1975).
31. ld. at 354.
32. ld. at 355.
33. Letter from James Madison (1833), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 326 (1884).
34. See, id. at 333 and the discussion in the text at infra note 60, as well as R. MoRGAN,
JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 197-99 (1988).
35. Madison, supra note 30, at 354.
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the collective interests of the whole."36 That in tum, he worried,
would erode public confidence in and the stability of republican
government. Madison lamented that elected representatives could
not be completely trusted, that they often acted as "advocates for
the respective interests of their constituents"37 and as "dupe[s] of a
favorite leader." As a result, legislative majorities were prone to
enact "base and selfish measures, masked by pretexts of public good
and apparent expediency."3s Popular majorities outside of legislative halls were "still more fatal."39
Even without acceptable alternatives, republicanism was problematic for Madison. He agreed that, "[i]n republican Government
the majority ... ultimately g[a]ve the law." But, more importantly,
he pondered, "what is to restrain [the majority] from unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals?"40
Madison's solution to the problem of republicanism was
neither simple nor entirely shared by his contemporaries. It sprang
in part from deconstructing the traditional understanding of republicanism. First, Madison doubted that elected representatives and
popular majorities could be reliably restrained by considerations of
either the civic "good of the Community" or personal character and
reputation; appeals to religion were even more problematic.41 Second, he rejected Montesquieu's teaching that republican forms of
government were possible only in small territories. In his Vices,
during the convention, and later in the Federalist, he advanced his
well-known argument for republicanism based on a large extended
republic. 42
When introducing in Vices the idea that "the enlargement of
the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights,"43
Madison aims to show how oppression by popular majorities might
be minimized. In an extended and populous territory, "common
interests or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combina36. Madison, Notes on Debates (Jan. 28, 1783), reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 141, 147 (1969).
37. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 373-74 (1973).
38. Madison, supra note 30, at 354.
39. !d. at 355.
40. /d. at 355-56.
41. !d. at 356. See also the discussion in the text at infra note 139.
42. See, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 14, and 63, at 77, 99, and 382 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961).
43. Madison, supra note 30, at 357. This is Madison's "naturalist" argument for republicanism. It rests on the recognition that (I) perceived self-interests of individuals incline
them to band together in common interests and passions, and (2) a vast and plentiful land
makes their doing so difficult. Time, territory and other difficulties of concerted action over
great distances within each state constitute barriers that must be overcome.
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tions less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number. "44
The heterogeneity of growing populations brings "a greater variety
of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other."4s
These sociological and geographical factors weigh as well in the
political process. If properly designed, governmental institutions
would encourage the "refinement of [public] opinion" and make
possible governance by a moderate "constitutional majority."46
Madisonian republicanism thus placed a premium on the inevitability and desirability of a kind of liberal toleration that accompanies
the cultural pluralism of large populous territories.
From Madison's perspective, Montesquieu's teaching that republicanism was feasible only in small territories was not just
wrong; it was wholly inapplicable to the American experience. By
Montesquieu's standards, Madison's beloved state of Virginia (with
its estimated 125,525 square miles47) was too large to sustain republicanism. But, on Madison's reconstructed republicanism, the opposite appeared closer to the truth. Even the individual states could
enjoy the benefits of being expanded republics. Indeed, Virginia
needed to grow in population in order to guard against oppression,
especially in the name of religion, by state legislative majorities.4s
Madison wondered whether "the inconveniences of popular States
contrary to the prevailing Theory [that is, Montesquieu's theory],
are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their
[territorial] limits."49 For these reasons, he consistently encouraged
immigration into the United States, the country's territorial expansion, and the creation of new states.
For strategic reasons, Madison did not touch upon the idea
that the states might themselves be "extended republics" in the Federalist. When differentiating republicanism from "a pure democracy"so in Federalist Number 10, Madison does so in language
reminiscent of that in Vices and equally applicable to curbing popular majorities within each state as well as the nation. "The two
great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are,"
in his words, "first, the delegation of the government, in the latter,
to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the
greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which
44. /d.
45. /d.
46. Madison, supra note 33, at 333.
47. See, I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 96 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
48. See, e.g., Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 ( 1973).
49. Madison, supra note 30, at 357.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 42, at 81.
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the latter may be extended."s1 Both were crucial and interdependent. The first, one of political design, bears on the Constitution's
creation of a representative form of government and system of institutional checks and balances. The second, Madison's "naturalist"
argument, is the one stressed in Federalist Number 10. Referring to
the utility of an economy of scale in terms of population and territory, Madison observes:s2
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficulty for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison
with each other.

This "advantage which a republic has over a democracy," he notes,
"is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is enjoyed by the
Union over the States composing it."s3 Although not pressing the
point here, Madison recognized that this advantage was also one
that republican governments in large states had over those in small
states. Instead, Madison concludes Federalist Number 10 with the
hope that though "factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States ... [they] will be unable to spread a general conflagration throughout the other States. "s4
One of Madison's distinctive contributions to republicanism
was his "naturalist" argument. No less critical, though, was his
thought about the architectural design of governmental institutions.
Representative government required additional institutional checks
and balances or, as he referred to them elsewhere in the Federalist,
"auxiliary precautions."ss In a well-known passage in Federalist
Number 51, Madison highlights their importance when asking
"what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature?"s6
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing government, which is to be administered by men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity
of auxiliary precautions.

Again, in Federalist Number 63, he emphasizes that the "advantage
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

/d. at 82.
/d. at 83.
/d.
/d. at 84.
See, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51 and 63 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 317 and 382.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 322.
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[of a large and populous republic] ought not to be considered as
superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. "57
How far Madison distanced the institutions of republican government from majoritarianism is underscored in Federalist Number
39. There, he again distinguishes the Constitution's creation from
democratic and other kinds of regimes. In a republican form of
government, "[i]t is essential to such a government that it be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it."5s This feature of republicanism
distinguishes the Constitution from "mixed regimes," such as that
in England, and from aristocratic and monarchic regimes. It was
even further removed from majoritarian democracy by Madison's
observation that
It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified [that is, popularly elected
representatives, who hold "their offices during pleasure for a limited behavior"]. 59

Distinguishing between republicanism and majoritarian democracy
in this way points towards Madison's resolution of the problem
with republicanism. The Constitution created a system of representative government in which the "political and constitutional majority [governs] in contradistinction to a numerical majority of the
people."60 In the Madisonian system, the governing constitutional
majority is necessarily a numerical minority when compared with
the more numerous and popular majority within the states. Still, in
large and populous territories, government by a constitutional majority, subject to the auxiliary precautions of institutional checks
and balances, was the only way Madison deemed republican liberty
might be secured against majoritarianism in the states and the
nation.
While defending the Constitution in the Federalist, Madison
concealed deep disappointment with the document. The Constitutional Convention failed to embrace all of the auxiliary precautions
demanded by his vision of republicanism. The "excesses of democracy"6t were insufficiently curbed to ensure the "genius of republican liberty."62 Although the Convention agreed to the supremacy
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 385.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 241.
59. /d.
60. Madison, supra note 33, at 333.
61. E. Gerry in I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 48 (M. Farrand
ed. 1914); and THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 244.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 224, and 227.
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of the Constitution and congressional legislation over state laws, 63 it
rejected one "great desideratum:"64 a national sanction, or veto,
over state laws.
Shortly before the convention, Madison wrote George Washington that "a negative in all cases what-so-ever on the legislative
acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative,
appears to me to be absolutely necessary." "The great desideratum," he explained, was "some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions & interests in the State."
Without that, the national government's powers could be "evaded
& defeated" by the states. "Another happy effect of this prerogative," he added, "would be its control on the internal vicissitudes of
State policy; and the aggressions of interested majorities on the
rights of minorities and individuals. "6s
Though failing to indicate to Washington how a national veto
would be exercised, Madison immediately turned to the necessity of
establishing the "national supremacy" of the judiciary and executive branch. Later, he stood behind, and probably wrote,66 the socalled "Virginia Plan."67 Submitted for consideration at the Constitutional Convention by Edmund Randolph, that plan would have
empowered Congress to veto state legislation and to enact legislation overriding state laws deemed defective or disruptive of national
harmony. Moveover, it called for the creation of a council of revision (composed of members of the judiciary and the executive
branch) which would have the power to veto congressionallegislation.6s Both proposals registered Madison's distrust of legislative
majorities. When defending a council of revision on three separate
occasions at the convention, he returned to the analysis originally
contained in Vices:69
It would be useful to the Judiciary departm[en]t by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself ag[ain]st: Legislature encroachments .... It would moreover be useful to the Community at large as an additional check ag[ain]st a pursuit
of those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities [under the Articles of Confederation]. ... Experience in all the States had
evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex.
This was the real source of danger to the American Constitutions; & suggested the

63.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Madison, supra note 28, at 384.
65. /d. at 383-84.
66. See, I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-54 (1950).
67. See, Farrand, supra note 61, at 28.
68. The idea of a council of revision was not new. The New York state constitution
provided for such a council and there was pressure in other states to adopt such provisions
due to growing distrust of legislative majorities. See, Wood, supra note 27, at 435-36 and
455-56.
69. Madison, in Farrand, supra note 61, Vol. 2, at 74.
64.
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necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles.

Unfortunately, from Madison's perspective, the Constitutional Convention rejected both proposals for checking legislative majorities in
Congress and the states.
Less than two weeks before the Constitutional Convention adjourned, Madison complained to Thomas Jefferson that the Constitution would "neither effectively answer its national object nor
prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts against
the state governments. 10 In another letter to Jefferson the following
year, he renewed the complaint that "parchment barriers" inadequately dealt with the underlying threat to republican liberty. That
threat arises from the people, "not from acts of the Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the
constituents . . . This is a truth of great importance," which,
Madison lamented, was "not yet sufficiently attended to."7t
Madison's republicanism is richer and more complex than
Bickel and Bork contend. Popular majorities, legislative majorities,
and majoritarian democracy were far more troubling for Madison
than they concede. At the heart of the Madisonian system was republican liberty, not majoritarianism. Madison reconstructed republican theory in light of the American experience and demand for
popular and representative government. He did so in ways that retained republicanism's association with ultimate popular sovereignty, while disassociating it from majoritarianism in the normal
operation of government. His "naturalist" argument for how large
and populous territories might augment the benefits of representative government made republicanism more agreeable. Still unsatisfied, Madison sought auxiliary institutional precautions against the
oppressive majoritarianism in Congress and in the states. At virtually every turn, he limited majoritarianism in defense of republican
liberty. That is why Madison despaired at the Constitutional Convention's refusal to grant a national veto over state laws and to provide an additional check on legislative majorities within Congress.
"It seems to be forgotten," Madison reflected in his twilight years,
"that the abuses committed within the individual States ... by interested or misguided majorities were among the prominent causes
of the [the Constitution's] adoptions, and particularly led to the
70.

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), reprinted in 10
163 (1977).
71. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (1977).
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provlSlon .
which gives an appellate supremacy to the judicial
department of the United States."n
II.

MADISON AND "PARCHMENT BARRIERS"

Though drafting and introducing in the First Congress the
amendments that eventually became the Bill of Rights, Madison
was at best a reluctant supporter of what he considered "the nauseous project of amendments. "73 He resisted the project for several
reasons. First, the Constitutional Convention's objective was
strengthening, not weakening, the national government. And at the
convention he had unsuccessfully pressed for additional institutional safeguards for republican liberty. Second, he tended to agree
with James Wilson74 and Alexander Hamilton7s that since the national government was limited to exercising expressly delegated
powers, it had no power to legislate on such matters as religion and
the press. In addition, as late as 1788 he opposed Anti-federalists'
demands because he worried that amendments would only complicate the ratification battle. Finally, he doubted that "declarations
on paper" would be "an effective restraint."76 "[I]n a Government
of opinion like ours," the most effective safeguard was the "soundness and stability of the general opinion on the subject. "77 Madison
shared the view expressed by John Mercer toward the end of the
convention that, "[i]t is a great mistake to suppose that the paper
we are to propose will govern the United States. It is the men
whom it will bring into the government and interest in maintaining
it that is to govern time. The paper will only mark out the mode
and form. Men are the substance and must do the business."7s
Madison's initial position, however, did not disparage republican liberty or a declaration of rights in favor of legislative majorities. Quite the contrary. At the Constitutional Convention, as
noted, he pressed for a national veto over state laws and a council of
revision in order to guard against the denial of individual rights by
72. Madison, supra note 33, at 328.
73. Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346 (1979).
74. See, J. Wilson, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CoNVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 434-37 (J. Elliot ed. 2d. ed. 1888) (hereafter cited as

Elliot's Debates].
75. See, THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at 481.
76. Madison, supra note 73, at 347.
77. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 273, 275 (1884).
78. Quoted by J. Madison in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 455-56 (A. Kock ed. 1966).
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the states and Congress. In 1785, when offering advice on a constitution for Kentucky, he likewise endorsed the creation of a council
of revision and the incorporation of provisions expressly restraining
the state legislature from "meddling with religion- from abolishing
Juries, from taking away the Habeas corpus-from forcing a citizen
to give evidence against himself, from controuling the press. "79
"Experience and refiection"8o led Madison to reconstruct republicanism. So too, he was later led to embrace parchment guarantees for republican liberty. In December 1787, Jefferson wrote
him complaining about "the omission of a bill of rights."81 That
was the first of several letters contributing to his change in thinking.
But, Madison's own political fate in 1788 was important as well.
The Anti-federalists' opposition to the Constitution over the omission of a declaration of rights became increasingly worrisome. By
June of 1788, the Anti-federalists were campaigning for a second
constitutional convention. That prospect disturbed Madison, as did
two votes that June in Virginia's state ratifying convention. The
Anti-federalists' call for conditional amendments was defeated by a
vote of 88 to 80, and the Constitution ratified by an 89-to-79 vote.
Yet, the closeness of those votes moved Madison to publicly endorse a declaration of rights. Then, the Virginia legislature refused
to elect him to a seat in the United States Senate. He was outmaneuvered by Patrick Henry's attack on the sincerity of his promise
to push for amendments in Congress.82 With his subsequent election to the House of Representatives, Madison was fully converted
to the adoption of amendments. Still fearing the possibility of a
second constitutional convention, he vowed to introduce amendments because that was "the most expeditious mode ... [and] the
safest mode. "83
In July 1788, Jefferson again wrote Madison about the urgency
of adopting a declaration of rights, but the letter failed to arrive
until October 15.84 Two days later he responded with an extraordinary one of his own, explaining he had "always been in favor of a
bill of rights" and yet "never thought the omission a material de79. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 35 (1973).
80. Madison, supra note 33, at 327.
81. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 12
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (1955).
82. See, generally, R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 19498 (1969).
83. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 404-05 (1977).
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in 13
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442 (1956).
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fect."s' Madison gave four reasons for his ambivalence. First, he
accepted the Federalists' argument that "the rights in question are
reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted."
Second, he feared "that a positive declaration of some of the most
essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." In
particular, "the rights of Conscience" might be narrowed by any
formal-legal definition. Third, republican liberty was guarded
against Congress by its constitutionally "limited power" and "the
jealousy" of the states. Finally, he maintained that "experience
proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its
control is most needed. "s6
Madison did not view a declaration of rights in a more "important light" primarily because of his theory of republicanism. In a
monarchy, such guarantees might have "great effect, as a standard
for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing &
uniting the superior force of the community."s7 But, republicanism
rested on popular sovereignty; in the end political power resided
with the majority of the people. What use then, he rhetorically
asked, would a declaration of rights have in a republic?
His answer was two-fold and indicated a further refinement of
his theory of republicanism. Republican liberty, he reiterated, "is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government
is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."ss
A declaration of rights might educate and unite the people in support of republican liberty. "The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with
the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion."89 Moreover, Madison now conceded that, in the event of an
abusive government, a declaration of rights might serve "as a good
ground for an appeal to the sense of the community."90
Basically, Madison came to favor a declaration of rights because of the wide-spread demand for it and because of its potential
"to impress some degree of respect for [its guarantees and] to establish public opinion in their favor."9I He had yet to connect a decla85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
PERS OF

Madison, supra note 71, at 297.

/d.

/d.
/d. at 298.
/d.
/d. at 299.
Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE PAJAMES MADISON, at 196, 205. See a/so, Madison, The Bank Bill (feb. 2, 1791),
reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372, 375 (1981).
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ration of rights and the kinds of institutional checks and balances he
pushed for during the Constitutional Convention. On receiving his
letter, however, Jefferson immediately responded by pointing out
the omitted argument, "which has great weight with me, the legal
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."92 Persuaded,
Madison finally made a connection between a declaration of rights
and the role of the Court. Three months later he relied on that
argument in the House of Representatives when introducing his
proposed amendments:93
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be
an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.

Still, in spite of that grand oration and instead of expanding on the
Court's role, Madison concentrated on turning the four principal
arguments against such additions into good republican arguments
for their adoption.
Madison's main arguments in the House of Representatives,
again, registered his commitment to republican liberty and distrust
of majoritarianism. It had been argued that a declaration of rights
was unnecessary because no such declaration existed in England.
Never an Anglophile, Madison objected to the comparison (one
that Justice Scalia now finds so attractive).94 England was not
"wholly republican." Parliament's legislative power was "indefinite," and thus a constant threat to republican liberty. The Magna
Carta, moreover, stood as a barrier only against the Crown and contained no guarantee for "[t]he freedom of the press and rights of
conscience, those choicest privileges of the people. "9s Conceding
that parchment barriers were weak, Madison observed that "they
may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of
power"96 by inspiring public opinion and the support of the
judiciary.
Madison also now found inconclusive the Federalist argument
that a declaration was unnecessary because the national government
was limited to only enumerated powers. He countered that Congress had vast uncertain powers under the Necessary and Proper
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), repn·nted in 14
659 (1958).
93. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 206-07.
94. See Scalia, supra note 8.
95. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 203.
96. !d. at 206.
92.
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Clause,97 and recalled the abuses of legislative majonttes in the
states. As in Vices, he argued that legislative power tends to expand
to an "indefinite extent."9s Legislative majorities, whether in Congress or the states, were often moved to deny the rights of individuals and minorities. "If there was reason for restraining state
governments," reasoned Madison, "there is like reason for restraining the federal government."99 No more persuasive was the
contention that a declaration of rights was unnecessary because
state constitutions contained such provisions. Besides the fact that
some states had no such guarantees, others contained "defective"
and "absolutely improper" provisions.
Finally, Madison took up the argument advanced by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 84. A declaration of rights, claimed
Hamilton, was "not only unnecessary ... but would even be dangerous" in defining exceptions to powers not granted and leaving
"the utmost latitude of evasion." too Admitting that was "one of the
most plausible arguments" against amendments, Madison responded by directing attention to his proposal which later became
embodied in the ninth amendment.tot It provided that, "[t]he exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people."to2
Madison's defense of what became the ninth amendment reflected Jefferson's influence. Madison had once feared "that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be
obtained in the requisite latitude."to3 But, Jefferson reassured him
that, "[h]alf of a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all
our rights, let's secure what we can." Jefferson moved Madison to
view a declaration of rights as another auxiliary measure, which put
into "the hands of the judiciary" an additional check on the coercive power of legislative majorities. "This is a body," Jefferson had
observed, "which is rendered independent, and kept strictly to their
own department merits great confidence for their learning and
integrity."t04
Though converted to defending a declaration of rights,
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
98. Madison, supra note 91, at 205.
99. /d. at 206.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at 513-14.
101. The ninth amendment provides that, "(t)he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST., amend. IX.
102. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 202.
103. Madison, supra note 71, at 297.
104. Jefferson, supra note 92, at 659-60.
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Madison by no means held it in the same light as Jefferson. Like
the Anti-federalists, Jefferson was primarily concerned with
"guard[ing] the people against the federal government, as they are
already guarded against their state governments in most instances."tos For Madison the principal threat to republican liberty
came not from the national government, but from the influence of
popular and legislative majorities in Congress and the states. He
never abandoned his preoccupation with the darker side of
majoritarian rule. As a consequence, whatever "legal check" the
amendments might give the judiciary, in the 1780s Madison considered them little more than another precautionary measure.t06
Madison's republicanism guided and structured the amendments introduced in the House. Notably, his first proposal reinforced the bedrock of republicanism as a prefix to the
Constitution: 101
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the
people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the
purpose of its institution.

The people are sovereign and ultimately "the best keepers"tos of
republican liberty. Rather than embracing majoritarianism in the
normal operation of government, Madison thereby aimed to reaffirm that, in the event of an oppressive government, the people
might undertake constitutional reforms, either through the amendment processt09 or subversion of the government. Yet, so long as
the Constitution remained in place, the "constitutional majority" it
created governed. Republican liberty, Madison remained convinced, was more likely to be secured through representative government, as constrained by auxiliary precautions and as augmented
by the benefits of large and populous territories. Still, if this experiment in constitutional government failed, he never doubted the ultimate power of the people to revise or abandon the Constitution.
How deeply Madison's libertarianism was woven into his theory of republicanism stands out not only in the amendments that
eventually comprised the Bill of Rights. Even more noteworthy
105. Jefferson, supra note 84, at 443.
106. See, Madison, supra note 71, at 299.
107. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 200.
108. Madison, supra note 22.
109. See, U.S. CONST. art. V.
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were his ill-fated proposals to bar Congress and the states from denying the "full and equal rights of conscience."Iw Because in the
1780s Madison held state legislative majorities to constitute a
greater danger than Congress, he considered his proposal denying
states the power to "infringe on the equal rights of conscience" to
be "the most important amendment on the whole list." 111 Later in
the 1790s, when opposing the national government's censorship of
the Democratic Societies and enactment of the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, Madison deemed Congress a more serious threat.II2
Although wavering on whether the major threat to republican liberty came at the national or state level, Madison remained steadfastly convinced that the threat originated with the people, "not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,
but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of
the major number of the constituents."II3
What finally emerged from the First Congress and was ratified
as the Bill of Rights disappointed Madison, once again. Congress
rejected his plan for inserting the amendments into the document
itself; he feared that those declarations of republican liberty might
be dismissed as less important than the Constitution itself. In addition, like the Constitutional Convention, Congress rejected his proposal for sharply checking the powers of the states. As historian
Jack Rakove puts it, "the most Madisonian element of the Constitution is arguably the fourteenth amendment, which was, of course,
adopted a full three decades after his death."II4
Ill.

MADISON ON THE SUPREME COURT AND
PRAGMATIC INTERPRETIVISM

Madison's appreciation for the Court's role in protecting republican liberty at times fell short of what his theory of republicanism could encompass. During the Constitutional Convention, his
concern with securing a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire in
disputes between different passions and interests in the State"! IS led
him to focus on a national veto over the states. Yet, he favored a
national veto by Congress, not the Court. Madison failed to foresee
110. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 201-02.
Ill. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 17, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 344 (1979).
112. See, Letters from James Madison to Jefferson and Monroe (1794), reprinted in !5
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 397-98, 406-07, and 419-20 (1985); and Madison, Repon
on the Virginia Resolution, reprinted in Elliot's Debates, supra note 74, at 549.
113. Madison, supra note 71, at 297 (emphasis added).
114. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 247
(1990).
115. Madison, supra note 28, at 384.
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the major role that the Court could play in defending national
supremacy and the rights of individuals and minorities. Besides underestimating the Court's power, he worried that states might refuse to comply with its rulings. Moreover, he looked to preventing
"injustice" from occurring in the states and Congress. Only after
the security of republican liberty has been ruptured, after legislation
is challenged through the adjudicatory process, does the Court
come into play. In the 1780s, he thus favored alternatives to relying
on the Court. It was "more convenient to prevent the passage of
law, than to declare it void after it is passed."116 Also, he noted,
individuals might not be financially able to appeal to the courts.
Madison's republicanism, nevertheless, laid a foundation for
the Court's protection of the rights of individuals and minorities.
His advocacy of a national veto led directly to the adoption of the
Supremacy Clause. The original jurisdiction granted in article
III,m and the appellate jurisdiction given in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, us expressly recognize the Court's role in defending national supremacy and republican liberty against the states.
In Federalist 39, Madison alluded to the Court's role as "the
tribunal which is ultimately to decide controversies relating to the
boundary between the two jurisdictions" 119 of the national and state
governments. Later in life, his appreciation grew for that role of the
Court. Writing to Jefferson in 1823, he recalled that the Constitutional Convention "intended the Authority vested in the Judicial
Department as a final resort in relation to the States."12o This position resonates throughout his correspondence.121 In a letter published in the influential North American Review in 1830, for
example, Madison took pride in his consistency by recalling his observation in Federalist 39. "Those who had denied or doubted the
supremacy of the judicial power of the U.S.," he added, "seem not
to have sufficiently adverted to the utter inefficiency of a supremacy
in a law of the land, without a supremacy in the exposition & execution of the law."122
116. Madison, supra note 71, at 211.
117. U.S. CoNST. art. III.
118. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 25.
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 381 (1977).
120. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), reprinted in 3
LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 322, 326 (1884).
121. See Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 346-51 (1910); Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist
(Dec. 1831), reprinted in 4 LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 204-05
(1884) and Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), reprinted in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 383 (1910).
122. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 121, at 397-98.
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Central to understanding the role the Court came to play in
Madison's theory of republicanism is the distinction he drew between, on the one hand, the "extreme cases"I23 that arise in a constitutional crisis and, on the other hand, "cases not of that extreme
character" which frequently arise in the course of constitutional
government.
In the "extreme cases," the vast majority of people hold the
ultimate political power. Nor could it be otherwise, since popular
sovereignty is the bedrock of republicanism. But, in such cases and
in keeping with John Locke's teaching on the right to revolution,I24
Madison cautioned that there could be "no regular Arbiter or Umpire" justifying a "resort to the original rights of the parties to the
system."12s With such appeals to simple majoritarianism, to the
"extra & ultra constitutional right" of the people, would come the
dissolution of the Constitution. Consequently, Madison lamented
popular appeals to the majoritarianism.I26 He insistently urged recourse to "the final resort, within the purview" of the Constitution,
namely, amending the Constitution through the prescribed method
in article V. In the event that the amendment process failed to satisfy, Madison allowed that a final appeal might be made directly to
the people "from the cancelled obligations of the constitutional
compact, to original rights & the law of self-preservation."I27
By contrast, in the routine controversies arising out of the normal operation of government, Madison considered the Court the
"surest expositor of the Constitution."12s As he explained in a letter in 1829, "there is & must be an Arbiter or Umpire in the constitutional authority provided for deciding questions concerning the
boundaries of right & power. The particular provision, in the Constitution of the U.S. is the authority of the Supreme Court, as stated
in the 'Federalist,' No. 39."129
In the 1830s, Madison often dwelt on the distinction between
the Court and the people as the ultimate arbiter of republican liberty and government. He did so for two reasons. First, growing
sectional conflict between the North and the South revived interest
in state nullification and his authorship of the Report on the Virginia
123. Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell, supra note 122, at 346, 351.
124. See, J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. 19, 454-77 (P. Laslett ed.
1965).
125. Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell, supra note 121, at 351.
126. Madison, supra note 120, at 140, 143.
127. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 121, at 398.
128. Letter from James Madison (1834), reprinted in 4 LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 349, 350 (1884).
129. Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell, supra note 121, at 351.
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Resolutions. 13o Second, his support of the national bank, and his
opposition to Jackson's veto of legislation recharting the bank, also
brought charges that he was inconsistent in his view of the Constitution. In response to controversies over state nullification and the
bank, Madison elaborated his views on the Court and developed his
unique theory of constitutional interpretation.
Sectional conflict revived interest in the doctrine of state nullification (that is, that states could nullify federal laws they deemed
unconstitutional). The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798
and 1799 had been drafted, respectively, by Madison and Jefferson
in protest of the Alien and Sedition Acts, passed by a Federalist
dominated Congress and aimed at silencing Jeffersonian Republicans. Along with contending that the acts ran afoul of the first
amendment, Jefferson went so far as to assert that states could nullify federal laws. The "sovereign and independent" states, asserted
the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, "have the unquestionable right to
judge ... and, that a nullification [by] those sovereignties, of all
authorized acts done under color of that instrument is the rightful
remedy." 131
In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, however, Madison
broke with Jefferson. Although masterfully defending civil liberties,
Madison's report declined to endorse state nullification of federal
laws.I32 Three decades later, amid renewed controversy over state
nullification, Madison objected to attempts to stamp his "political
career with discrediting inconsistencies," such as that he "on some
occasions, represented the Supreme Court of the United States as
the judge, in the last resort ... and on other occasions ha[d] assigned this last resort to the parties to the Constitution."I33 This
"extraordinary" charge rested on a distortion, he claimed, rather
than any inconsistency. "[T]he obvious explanation [was] that the
last resort means, in one case, the last within the purview and forms
of the Constitution, and in the other, the last resort of all, from the
Constitution itself to the parties who made it."134 Indeed, in his
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, he had emphasized that though
the Court was the political form of the last resort, "this resort must
necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the
130. Madison, supra note 112.
131. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in Elliot's Debates, supra note 74,
at 540-44.
132. See, Koch & Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1948).
133. Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, supra note 121, at 205.
134. /d. See also, Letter from James Madison to Daniel Webster (March 15, 1833),
reprinted in 4 LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 293 (1884).
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other departments of the government; not in the relation to the
rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the
judicial, as well as the other departments hold their delegated
trusts." 135
Even more than with the Court's assumption of a role in exercising a national veto over state laws, Madison's views matured and
sharpened with regard to the Court's role in disputes over the separation of powers. Prior to the Constitution's ratification, Madison
argued in the Federalist that "[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by terms of their common commission, neither of
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of
settling the boundaries between their respective powers."I36 While
not doubting that the Court would "ultimately decide"I3 7 disputes
over the constitutional boundaries between the national government
and the states, the Court's position relative to Congress and the
President appeared more problematic. In a debate during the First
Congress, for instance, Madison conceded that "in the ordinary
course of Government, ... the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary."IJs Yet, he asked "to know, upon
what principle it can be contended, that any one department draws
from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out
the limits of the powers of the several departments."I39 "Nothing,"
he insisted, "has yet been offered to invalidate the doctrine, that the
meaning of the Constitution may as well be ascertained by the legislative as by the judicial authority."I40
In the 1830s, the controversy over the national bank renewed
debate over the authoritativeness of rival interpretations of the Constitution. Madison's contemporaries again questioned his consistency. In December 1790, Hamilton had proposed that Congress
charter a national bank. The ensuing debate pitted Hamilton and
the Federalists against Madison and Jefferson over fundamental
principles of constitutional interpretation and politics. Hamilton
persuasively argued that Congress had broad constitutional authority to establish such a corporation.I4I The Senate, half of whose
members had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
unanimously gave its endorsement. But, in the House of Represent135. Madison, supra note 112, at 549.
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 314.
137. Id. at 245.
138. Address by James Madison to the House of Representatives, reprinted in I ANNALS
OF CONG. 520 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
139. /d.
140. Jd. at 568.
141. Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of An Act to Establish A Bank, reprinted
in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97 (H.C. Syrett ed. 1979).
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atives Madison countered that the creation of the bank went beyond
the scope of Congress's delegated powers.J42 By a vote of 39 to 20,
the House nevertheless adopted a bill chartering the bank. In 1791,
President George Washington signed the act incorporating, and
granting a twenty year charter to, the first Bank of the United
States.
When the bank's charter expired in 1811, one vote defeated its
renewal in Congress. Notably, as President, Madison supported the
bank and deemed its constitutionality settled. Four years later, economic hardships brought about by the War of 1812, and the national government's reliance on state banks for loans led Congress
to establish the second Bank of the United States, with another
twenty year charter. Opposition in the states remained strong and
eventually resulted in the Court's watershed ruling in McCulloch v.
Maryland.J43 There, Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the bank with a broad reading of congressional powers
reminiscent of Hamilton's arguments three decades earlier. Still,
opposition persisted and support for the bank was waning by 1832,
when Congress passed another bill extending the bank's charter.
When President Jackson vetoed the legislation recharting the
second national bank, he denied that McCulloch was binding and
advanced what has been called the "departmental theory" of judicial review, namely that each branch could authoritatively construe
its own constitutional powers.J44 In his Veto Message of 1832,
Jackson claimed that,
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as
it is understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more authority over
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the
President is independent of both.l45

Behind Jackson's veto message was a two-pronged theory. First, he
expressly denied that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution
had finality, or supremacy over that of the other branches. Second,
Jackson maintained that in some areas of constitutional politics the
Court simply had no authority to render decisions, while suggesting
that in other areas it could do pretty much what it wanted to do.
142. Madison, supra note 138, Vol. 2, at 1944-54. For a further discussion see
Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical
Analysis, 50 U. Pn-r. L. REv. 349 (1989).
143. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
144. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE DocTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 19·28 (1914).
145. Jackson, President's Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 582 (J. Richardson ed. 1917).
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The first prong was (and remains) even more controversial than the
second.l46
Jackson's veto message underscores how problematic the
Court's role remained fifty years after the Constitutional Convention. In part, it is fair to say, that was due to the Framers' failure to
think through the power of judicial review. Though they "anticipated some sort of judicial review," as political scientist Edward S.
Corwin observed, "it is equally without question that the ideas generally current in 1787 were far from presaging the present role of
the Court."I47 In a letter to Corwin, the noted historian Max Farrand agreed and concluded that "[t]he framers of the constitution
did not realize it themselves [how markedly different their conceptions of judicial review were]: they were struggling to express an
idea and their experience was as yet insufficient."I4s
Drawn once again into the controversy over the constitutionality of the national bank in the 1830s, Madison responded to charges
of "inconsistency between [his] objection to the constitutionality of
such a bank in 1791 and [his] assent in 1817." 149 At stake, he said,
was "the question of how far legislative precedents, expounding the
Constitution, ought to guide succeeding Legislatures and overrule
individual opinions."Iso Simply put, the constitutionality of the national "bank had undergone ample discussions" Is I in 1791 and
Madison failed to persuade. On the losing side of the controversy in
1791, he later favored the bank and felt obligated as President to
sign the recharting legislation into law. From his perspective, "[o]n
a simple question of constitutionality there was a decided majority
in favor of it."1s2 In other words, by 1817 the bank had operated
146.

For instance, Senator Daniel Webster thundered in the halls of Congress:
The President is as much bound by the law as any private citizen. . . . He may
refuse to obey the law, and so may a private citizen; but both do it at their own
peril, and neither of them can settle the question of its validity. The President may
say a law is unconstitutional, but he is not the judge. . . . If it were otherwise, there
would be no government of laws; but we should all live under the government, the
rule, the caprices of individuals ... .
[President Jackson's] message ... converts a constitutional limitation of power
into mere matters of opinion, and then strikes the judicial department, as an efficient department, out of our system ....
[The message] denies first principles. It contradicts truths heretofore received
as indisputable. It denies to the judiciary the interpretation of law.
D. WEBSTER, 8 CONG. DEBATES 1232, 1239-40 (1832).
147. E. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 A.P.S.R. 1078 (1936).
148. Letter from Farrand to Edward Corwin (January 3, 1939), in Edward Samuel
Corwin Papers, Box 3, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
149. Letter from James Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (1884).
150. /d. at 183-84.
151. /d. at 184.
152. /d. at 185.
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for over "twenty years with annual legislative recognitions ... and
with the entire acquiescence of all the local authorities, as well as of
the nation at large."ts3 "[U]nder these circumstances," Madison
claimed a veto of the bank bill would have been, as Jackson's veto,
in "defiance of all the obligations derived from a course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment
and intention."ts4
Madison's reconciliation of his positions on the constitutionality of the national bank reveals his underlying theory of pragmatic
constitutional interpretivism. As other scholars have shown, m
Madison had no truck with a "jurisprudence of original intentions,"
as championed by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. The Constitution, he repeatedly reminded his contemporaries, "was not, like the
fabled Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain."ts6
Madison was keenly attune to interpretative problems intertwining
the politics of interpretation and the interpretation of politics.m
He frequently noted, for example, the temptation to put
"glosses"tss on the text and the historical proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,' s9 as well as the limited reliability of such documents as The Federalist.'~ "As a guide in expounding and
applying the provisions of the Constitution," he stressed, "the debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character."t6t For those reasons, Madison also withheld
the publication of his notes on the Constitutional Convention for a
half-century, until after his death. Their publication, he explained,
was "delayed til the Constitution should be well settled by practice,
and till a knowledge of the controversial part of the proceedings of
153. /d. at 184.
154. /d.
155. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest/or the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204 (1980); Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1988); Kurland, The Constitution: The Framers' Intent, the Present, and the Future, 32 ST. Louts U.L.J. 17 (1987); Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1513 (1987); and Powell, The On'ginal Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
156. Letter from James Madison to William Cogswell (March 10, 1834), reprinted in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 533 (1910).
157. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to RobertS. Garnett (February II, 1824),
reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 367 (1884); Letter from
James Madison to N.P. Trist (March 2, 1827), reprinted in id. at 565; and Letter from James
Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (September 18, 1828), reprinted in id. at 637.
158. Letter from James Madison to William Cabell Rives (March 12, 1833), reprinted in
9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 511, 514 (1910).
159. See. e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (September 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 228 (1884).
160. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (April 17, 1824), reprinted in 3
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 435 (1884).
161. Madison, supra note 159, at 228.
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its framers could be turned to no improper account."I62
Madison took the pragmatic view that constitutional interpretation involves "practical judgment," not "solitary opinions as to
the meaning of the law or the Constitution, in opposition to a construction reduced to practice during a reasonable period of time." I63
Just as he rejected appeals to "original intentions," he held that a
"strict" or "literal" interpretation might be "a hard imputation on
the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution," as well as a "hard
rule of construction," potentially injurious to "the text of the Constitution" itself.I64 "[A]mong the obvious and just guides applicable to [interpreting] the Const[itutio]n," Madison listed:I6s
I. The evils & defects for curing which the Constitution was called for &
introduced.
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted.
3. The early, deliberate and continued practice under the Constitution, as
preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the
vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.

Beyond those practical guides, Madison counseled that "the true
and safe construction" of the Constitution would emerge in the
"course of practice" upon receiving "uniform sanction" over "a period of years and under the varied ascendency of parties."I66
Madison accorded precedents great weight and considered
them binding on the President and Congress, no less than on the
Court. Were it otherwise, as Jackson claimed in his veto message,
"uncertainty and instability [would be introduced] in[to] the Constitution."I67 When arguing that Presidents and legislators were
constitutionally obligated to adhere to well-established precedents
and practices, Madison drew on an analogy to the "binding influence" of the judicial doctrine of stare decisis.J68 In his view, a judge
should conform to precedents established "by the matured opinions
of the majority of his colleagues" and not "vary the rule of law
according to his individual interpretation of it."I69 If not, then
every newly reconstituted Court or "every new legislative opinion
162. /d.
163. Madison, supra note 149, at 185.
164. Madison, Memorandum on Power of the President to appoint Public Ministers &
Consuls in the recess of the Senate, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91, 9293 (1910).
165. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 372 (1910).
166. Madison, supra note 149, at 186.
167. /d. at 185.
168. /d. at 184-85.
169. /d. See also, Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell, supra note !57, at
642-43.
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might make a new Constitution, as the foot of every new chancellor
would make a new standard of measure."11o Judicial precedents
and established legislative practices had "authoritative force in settling the meaning of a law" not only because of Madison's theory of
pragmatic interpretativism. He also advanced the utilitarian consideration that "the good of society" required certainty, stability
and predictability in the law.171
Two years before his death in 1836 Madison concentrated specifically on the Court's role in constitutional politics. He reaffirmed
that since the Congress, the President, and the Court "are co-ordinate, and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows
that each must ... be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own interpretations of it."m However, "notwithstanding
this abstract view," Madison now emphasized that the Court "most
familiarizes itself to the public attention as the expositor, by the
order of its functions in relation to the other departments." He
never abandoned his view that Congress and the President might
construe the Constitution. But in light of a half-century's experience with the Constitution and the Court, he fully appreciated that
in actual practice the Court decides cases and controversies after
and in light of the interpretations advanced by Congress and the
President. The "ultimate discussion and operative decision,"I73
therefore, comes from the Court because it stands as the final forum
for appeals within government itself, short of either amending the
Constitution or, worse yet, appealing directly to the people, "that
Ultimate Arbiter."I74 Madison concluded that the Court was the
"last resort" and "surest expositor" of the Constitution in controversies over both federalism and the separation of powers within the
national government. "[W]hen happily filled," as he put it, the
Court was "the surest expositor of the Constitution" in controversies "concerning the boundaries between the several departments of
Government as in those between the Union and its members."I75
170. /d.
171. /d. Madison's views contrast sharply with Scalia's. See, Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989); and his
dissenting opinion in South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989). For a much
more Madisonian view of precedent, see Address by L. Powell, The Leslie H. Arps Lecture
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (October 17, 1989) ("Stare Decisis
and Judicial Restraint") text at 10-13.
172. Madison, supra note 128, at 349.
173. /d. at 350.
174. Madison, supra note 123, at 143.
175. Madison, supra note 128, at 350. This letter indicates that Madison's view of the
Court's institutional role matured and that he came to accept the Court as the "surest expositor of the Constitution" with regard to both disputes over federalism and the separation of

1991]

THE FRAMER'S MUSE
IV.

147

CONCLUSION

Madison's reconstruction of republicanism was unique and distinctively American. While popular sovereignty remained the bedrock of republicanism, Madison elevated republican liberty above
republican government. Because of his concern with the darker
side of republicanism (majoritarianism) he worked fundamental
changes in the theory and practice of republican government.
Madison's "naturalist" argument was instrumental in making
republicanism more acceptable by emphasizing the liberalism that
accompanies the cultural pluralism of large and populous territories. He turned to this new grounding for republican government
only in part out of rejecting of Montesquieu's teaching about small
republics. Madison also discounted the weight that Montesquieu,176 some Anti-federalists,111 and later Alexis de Tocqueville, 11s attributed to civic virtue and religion. Such appeals ran
against his secularism and abiding faith in reason. Far from being
reliable safeguards, they posed serious threats to the security of republican liberty. Indeed, throughout Madison's career a major concern remained securing religious freedom for individuals and
minorities against the oppressive forces of popular and legislative
majorities. 179
Building on his argument for republicanism in large and populous territories, Madison repeatedly sought to buttress representative government with auxiliary precautions for republican liberty.
Although he had preferred additional institutional checks against
legislative majorities in Congress and the states, the Constitution
even as written did not embrace simple majoritarianism, or legislative majoritarianism. For "the father of the Constitution," there
was no mystery in the making of free government: "mysteries belong to religion, not to government; to the ways of the Almighty,
not to the works of man. And in religion itself there is nothing
mysterious to its author; the mystery lies in the dimness of the
human sight. So in the institutions of government let there be no
powers, contrary to suggestion of some scholars. See, L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 103-06 (1988).
176. See, MONTESQUIEU, supra note 26, Vol. I, Bk. III, Ch. 3, at 117-18; Vol. II, Bk.
XXIV, Chs. 14 and 16, at 328 and 330.
177. See, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, (H. Storing ed. 1981) Vol. 3, Ch. 6, at
76; Vol. 4, Ch. 23, at 242; Vol. 4, Ch. 24, at 246-48; Vol. 5, Ch. 6, at 126-27; Vol. 5, Ch. 18, at
264; Vol. 6, Ch. 14, at 238-40. See also, Wood, supra note 27, at 34, 65-69, 92-96, 117-18,
418, 427-28, and 610.
178. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (P. Bradley ed. 1946) Vol. I,
at 304-06; Vol. II, at 121-27, and 143-44.
179. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 48, and supra note 71.
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mystery."tso
Madison refined the insights originally contained in Vices and
elaborated his theory of republicanism in response to the practical
problems of securing republican liberty. While publicly defending
and privately confessing disappointment with the Constitution,
Madison was moved to accept the "parchment barriers" of the Bill
of Rights and the Court's role in protecting republican liberty. He
reluctantly became "the father of the Bill of Rights." His theory of
republicanism accommodated the Bill of Rights and laid a foundation for its defense as a protection of the rights of individuals and
minorities.
Madison came to accept a more expansive role for the Court in
the 1830s than he anticipated in the 1780s. Admittedly, he did not
foresee the full development or potential of the Court. Nor, of
course, did he entertain the idea that the Court would be the sole, or
even primary, guardian of republican liberty. At times, he also bristled at the Court's intrusion into the domains of Congress and the
President. But Madison also harbored both a distrust of majoritarianism in the normal operation of government and a devotion to republican liberty. His unique theories of republicanism and
pragmatic interpretativism offer no support for the originalist philosophy advanced by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. Madison
never entertained the idea of returning to the English system of parliamentary democracy, in which legislative majorities dominate.
The Constitution, as he repeatedly emphasized, stood "without a
model, as emphatically sui generis."tst
In Madison's view, constitutional controversies found their resolutions in deliberations and adjudications that establish the binding precedents and practices of constitutional government. Because
of his pragmatic theory of constitutional interpretation, Madison
was convinced that those precedents and practices bound the President, Congress, and the Court, though remaining subject to reversal
by formal constitutional amendments. In the end, Madison considered the Court was the "last resort" and "surest expositor of the
Constitution" within constitutional government, while still maintaining that the ultimate security for (and ultimate threat to) republican liberty remained with the people.
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